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This paper presents an overview of the constitutional-
legal provisions on access to services in developing 
countries and shows that rights to public services are 
not justice-able. It further documents the performance 
record to show that governments’ response to such a weak 
accountability framework has been predictable – poor 
performance in service delivery with little accountability. 
The paper also shows that while there has not been a 
shortage of ideas on how to deal with this problem, most 
approaches have failed because they could not diagnose 
and deal with the underlying causes of government 
dysfunction. The paper presents an analytical perspective 
on understanding the causes of dysfunctional governance 
and the incentives and accountability regimes that have 
This paper—a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Division, World Bank Institute—is part 
of a larger effort in the department to deepen our knowledge on strengthening demand side accountability for good 
governance. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may 
be contacted at ashah@worldbank.org.  
the potential to overcome this dysfunction. The paper 
also documents practices that have shown some promise 
in improving access. The paper then integrates ideas from 
successful practices with conceptual underpinnings for 
good governance and presents a citizen-centric (rights 
based) governance approach to access. It further explores 
how such a citizen empowerment and government 
accountability framework can be implemented in 
practice, especially in the context of developing countries, 
where most governments still operate in a command and 
control environment with little or no orientation to serve 
their people. It also presents ideas on how to overcome 
resistance to such reforms. 
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1.  Introduction  
While there has been some progress on improving access during the past 50 years, access 
to basic services in developing countries, especially by the poor and other disadvantaged 
members of society, remains appalling. Many governments in developing countries see 
service provision as an act of benevolence rather than of responsive and accountable 
governance. Adam Smith wrote in the Wealth of Nations that “…it is not from the 
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the banker that we expect our service, but from 
the regard to their own interest.”  Taking this analogy to the public sector, how do we 
ensure that citizens in developing countries have the right to be served by their 
governments rather than be (ruthlessly) ruled upon? This paper discusses operational 
approaches to make this dream a reality. The overall thrust of such approaches is citizens’ 
empowerment to hold their governments to account for service delivery through an 
institutional framework with justice-able rights to public services and redress, and an 
accountability framework to deal with government failures.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an overview of the constitutional-
legal provision on access to services in developing countries and shows that rights to 
public services are not justice-able. It further documents the performance record to show 
that governments’ response to such a weak accountability framework has been 
predictable – poor performance in service delivery with little accountability.   Section 3 
shows that while there has not been a shortage of ideas on how to deal with this problem, 
most approaches failed because they failed to diagnose and deal with underlying causes 
of government dysfunction. Section 4 documents practical approaches that have shown 
some promise of success. In this context, the section  highlights successful experiences 
from around the globe where citizen activism or enlightened political leadership have 
resulted in improving access to service delivery with strengthened, bottom-up 
accountability. From these experiences, the chapter develops pathways to reforming 
  2corrupt and inefficient governments through effective voice and exit options by the 
citizens themselves, encouraging bottom-up processes rather than hoping that such 
reforms could  be adopted through top-down approaches.   Section 5 presents an 
analytical perspective on understanding the causes of dysfunctional governance and the 
incentives and accountability regimes that have the potential to overcome this 
dysfunction. A transactions costs approach is used to explain poor performance 
accompanied by a lack of accountability. Based upon this neo-institutional economics 
framework, operational ideas in holding various orders of government to account for 
standards of and access to public services are developed.  Section 6 integrates ideas from 
successful practices with conceptual underpinnings for good governance and presents a 
citizen-centric (rights based) governance approach to access. Section 7 explores how such 
accountability framework can be implemented in practice, especially in the context of 
developing countries, where most governments still operate in a command and control 
environment with little or no orientation to serve their people. The section also discusses 
how resistance to such reforms could be overcome.     
2.  Access to Basic Services in Developing Countries  
 
2.1  The Promise –  Constitutional Access Rights to Basic Services 
 
Developing countries have set lofty constitutional rights to basic services. Table 1 
provides a summary view of such rights in large countries. In most countries, access to 
primary and secondary education is guaranteed free of cost to all. Nigeria goes further 
and promises free university education to its citizens as well. Most governments also 
promise to provide universal and almost free access to health care. China, Nigeria and 
Pakistan also assure free shelter to the needy. Nearly one in every two countries promise 
welfare assistance to mothers, children, and needy persons, assistance to those out of 
work, old age protection, equal economic opportunity and safeguards for minorities and 
disadvantaged groups.  
 
 
  3Table 1: Constitutional Rights of Access to Basic Services in Large Countries  
(with 2005 Population Over 75 million) 
Countries  Free PSE  SSE  Public  
Health 
care 
Water Sanitation  Shelter  SW  SP  EO  PDAG 
Bangladesh 
(142m) 
Free high school 
education 
  Y        Y  Y Y Y 
Brazil  (186m)  Free  Y        Y  Y Y Y 
China (1304 m)  Only PSE Free  Y      Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
India  (1095m)  Free  Y          Y  Y 
Indonesia  (221m)  Free               
Mexico (103m)  Free           Y  Y     
Nigeria*(132m) Free  Y      Y    Y   Y 
Pakistan  (156m)  Free        Y Y Y  Y  Y 
Philippines  (83m)  Free  Y            Y 
Vietnam  (83m) Free  Y        Y     
Notes: Y =Yes, N= No, PSE: Primary school education; SSE: Secondary school education; SW: social 
welfare; SP: social protection; EO: Equal opportunity; PDAG: protection of disadvantaged groups 
*Nigeria guarantees free education at all levels including the university education  
Source: Constitutions of countries listed 
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Beyond constitutional rights, the international development community has frequently 
made promises to advance access to basic services. In 1977, in Mar del Plata, Argentina, 
a UN convention established goals to provide safe water and sanitation for all by the end 
of 1980s (United Nations 1977). In 1990, this deadline was extended to 2000.  In 1978, in 
Almaty, Kazakhstan, all governments pledged to provide “health care for all” by 2000 
(World Health Organization and United Nations Children’s Fund 1978).  In 1990, in 
Jomtien, Thailand the goal for achieving universal primary schooling by 2000 was set.  In 
September 2000, in New York, world leaders agreed to establish eight millennium 
development goals to be achieved by year 2015.  These included halving poverty and 
hunger, achieving universal access to primary education, reducing child mortality rates 
by two-thirds and maternal mortality rates by three-fourths, arresting HIV/AIDS and 
Malaria, improving access to safe water and sanitation by half, and improving housing 
for at least 100 million slum dwellers.    
 
2.2  The Results in Service Delivery and Access So Far 
 
In most developing countries, the constitutional mandate for rights to basic services is not 
fully mandated. While a government may strive to provide for these basic services, there 
is no accountability if the promised access is not delivered. In fact, in a majority of cases, 
access to basic services such as education and health remains highly constrained for 
disadvantaged groups such as women, the poor, the needy and rural residents. Residents 
in almost all countries in South Asia and Sub-Sahara Africa do not have any access to 
social protection and social safety nets in spite of lofty constitutional promises.   
As far as the MDGs are concerned, there has been significant progress in recent years in 
dealing with poverty and hunger but mainly because of the economic success of China 
and India. Africa, however, has made only small gains in dealing with poverty and 
hunger. The goal of universal primary education appears achievable in East Asian and 
Pacific-Rim countries, Eastern Europe and Latin America, but Sub-Sahara Africa and 
South Asia are still lagging behind. While some progress has been made, the goals of 
  5reducing child and maternal mortality are also unlikely to be achieved by 2015 as reliable 
statistics are not available to monitor progress. Similarly, there are no reliable statistics 
available to monitor progress in arresting HIV/AIDS and Malaria.  Most regions have 
made excellent progress in improving access to safe water, but progress has been slower 
in providing sanitation, especially in Sub-Sahara Africa. Improving the housing 
conditions for slum dwellers also remains an unmet challenge.  
3.  Approaches to Improving Access That Have Not Succeded As 
Well As Expected 
 
Development literature is replete with examples of approaches that have not succeded as 
well as expected to make a difference in improving access to basic services over the last 
five decades. A few examples of such well known approaches are discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
Provide More and More External Assistance  
 
Foremost advocates of this approach are some leading academics such as Jeffrey Sachs, 
Paul Collier and Nicholas Stern (see United Nations, 2005). The basic argument in 
support of such higher assistance is that developing countries lack the technical know-
how and finance to deal with issues confronting their development and an infusion of 
foreign capital and know-how will help overcome these obstacles. This approach has lot 
of merit but the past history of external assistance does not provide much comfort 
regarding the success of this approach, as most studies confirm that external assistance 
has not been as productive as anticipated (Broad and Cavanagh 2006, Rodrik, 2006).   
This is because a significant fraction of  these projects do not  show successful 
sustainable outcome,  and many policy reforms are also sometimes either postponed or 
delayed in anticipation of qualifying for higher assistance in the absence of reform 
(Huther, Roberts and Shah, 1997).  
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Spend More and Do More 
 
This approach espouses the view that the government’s lack of adequate revenues 
contributes to less than adequate service delivery.   Government performance could be 
improved by allowing a government greater access to revenues to promote higher public 
spending.  Mounting evidence on developing country experiences does not substantiate 
the view that higher spending leads to improved and better quality of public services. In 
fact, the record shows that there is no one-to-one relationship between spending and 
service delivery in developing countries. Instead, in many countries, higher spending led 
to reduced access to basic public services due to dysfunctional governance (see World 
Development Report 2004 and Huther, Roberts and Shah 1998).   
 
Spend Less and Do Less 
 
This represents a leviathan view of government where government bureaucracies may be 
too large and therefore downsizing and outsourcing government functions may improve 
government efficiency (Gangl 2007).  This approach may be helpful up to a limit, but 
there are some critical functions, such as unemployment insurance, social welfare 
assistance and environmental protection, that the private sector may not be able to 
perform, or at least not adequately without government oversight (Kitchen 2005).   
 
Run Government Like a Private Business 
 
There is some merit in applying business principles in managing government operations 
(Dickenson 1996), however, in government, lack of a bottom-line makes the application 
of such an approach difficult. This is because the government has the power of extortion 
and can carry out taxation in perpetuity to finance its deficits. Government managers 
therefore may have the luxury of consistently making bad decisions without facing the 
consequences of these decisions. In the private sector, on the other hand, poor managerial 
  7decisions affect the profitability of the firm and a multitude of such decisions may put the 
firm out of business. 
 
Hire Better People and Find an Enlightened Leader 
 
This approach advances the viewpoint that government operations could be improved by 
introducing meritocracy in civil service by seeking enlightened leaders. Developing 
country experiences show that countries with merit based civil service such as India, 
Nigeria and Pakistan performed quite poorly in service delivery as the problem was not 
the people but the governmental system that failed to provide incentives for results based 
accountability. As far as the enlightened leader is concerned, it is difficult to envisage a 
democratic political process to identify and install such leadership.  
 
Reform Government by Strengthening Internal Top-down Processes (Strengthening 
Vertical Hierarchical Accountability) 
 
While streamlining managerial oversight is a desirable goal, developing country 
experiences do not provide support for the view that simply strengthening top down 
processes improves government’s service delivery performance (Jenkins, 2007 and Veron 
et. al, 2006).       
 
Combat Corruption through Anti-corruption Agencies 
 
An important reason for failed access to basic public services is that public resources are 
siphoned off through corruption and malfeasance. Anti-corruption agencies, or 
“watchdog” agencies, have often been advocated as an antidote to corruption, but in 
countries with endemic corruption, these agencies have been shown to compound the 
incidence of corruption.  Their effectiveness depends on the “governance-corruption 
nexus” – where there is good governance, anti-corruption agencies can be effective, 
where governance is weak, they often add to the existing corruption (Shah 2007, 246) and  
can be abused as tools for victimization of political opponents (Pope and Vogl, 2000).  
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Improve Fiscal Transparency and Financial Accountability 
 
These are desirable reform measures but in countries with high incidences of corruption 
and absence of rule of law, they have proven to be less effective in improving 
government performance. This is because fiscal transparency initiatives in developing 
countries typically result in making complex and incomprehensible data available to 
public in a non-user friendly manner. Most citizens have neither the interest nor the 
ability to sift through complex morass of fiscal data that lack any service delivery 
performance information.  Such complexity of details devoid of any performance 
information simply reinforces citizens’ mistrust of their governments. Strengthening 
financial accountability have also not yielded the desired results in improving 
government effectiveness in countries with poor governance as in corrupt environments 
they have failed to prevent cooking the books at least change citizens’ perceptions 
regarding such perceived malfeasance. The usual perception in developing countries is 
that measures to strengthen financial accountability simply allow corrupt officials to 
maintain consistent set of accounts without curtailing their corrupt acts (see also Khan, 
2007, Dye, 2007, Shah, 2007, De Mello, Jr., 2000).  Recent experiences of OECD 
countries suggest that such measures improve government performance, if there is good 
governance in the first place. Further even in OECD countries, the success of fiscal 
transparency initiatives depend upon: (a) simple and relevant information being provided 
to citizens in a user-friendly manner; (b) citizens have the opportunity to engage without 
being overtaxed by excessive consultation requirements; and (c) the citizens trust 
government’s resolve to transparency and integrity (see Wright, 2008). The above 
conditions are often not satisfied in transparency initiatives undertaken by governments 
in countries with high incidence of corruption.                    
 
Build Technical Capacity 
 
Building technical capacity is of little use in public sector environments that are ripe with 
rent seeking. Lack of technical capacity has little to do with dysfunctional governance in 
  9developing countries. Countries with technically competent bureaucracies often fail to 
serve their citizens in the absence of an incentive regime that reinforces results based 
accountability.  
 
Implement Participatory Approaches to Budgeting and Decision Making 
 
Participatory budgeting represents a direct democracy approach to budgeting. Done right, 
it has the potential to make governments more responsive to citizens’ needs and more 
accountable to them for performance in resource allocation and service delivery. It 
nevertheless comes with significant risks.  Participatory processes can sometimes be 
captured by interest groups, masking the undemocratic, exclusive, or elite nature of 
public decision making, and giving the appearance of broader participation and inclusive 
governance, while at the same time using public funds to advance the interests of 
powerful elites (Banerjee et. al 2008, Shah, 2007). To prevent these abuses, participatory 
process should be coupled with an emphasis on good governance, and must fully 
recognize local politics and the formal and informal power relations that exist, so that the 
process yields outcomes desired by the median voter.   
 
Treat Citizens as Clients and Strengthen Social Accountability 
 
The main argument is that treating citizens as clients/consumers would help government 
improve service delivery performance because citizen feedback would serve as an 
important influence in overcoming deficiencies in service delivery systems (see World 
Development Report, 2004). The social accountability framework takes this idea further 
by emphasizing the importance of civic engagement in serving clients better. These 
approaches provide a public sector analogue to consumer sovereignty in the market place.   
This view is helpful (see Box 1 for often cited “success” stories) but suffers from a 
fundamental conceptual weakness i.e. a recognition that while in the market place 
consumer sovereignty reigns supreme due to its effect on the bottom-line. There is no 
parallel accountability mechanism in the public sector.  In fact, the public sector can 
continue to survive and even prosper due to the legal power of extortion (taxation) 
  10enshrined by law, whether or not “consumers” are exercising their sovereignty. 
Therefore, this paradigm would fail to induce any accountability where the regime in 
power may not be receptive to citizens’ views as citizens are disempowered in this 
framework.  In fact, some corrupt regimes and interest groups may abuse so-called 
participatory approaches to unleash a tyranny of the elite (see Cooke and Kothari, 2001 
and Shah, 2007).  
 
Box 1.  The Practice of Social Accountability – Often cited “Success” Stories 
 
The following are the often cited “successful” examples of social accountability. 
 
  Mexico Electoral Accountability: The Federal Electoral Institute has the mandate  to hold 
elections and has done so far successfully by having all political parties represented on 
the executive council. It is not clear whether this indeed represents a successful case as 
the last federal election was disputed by the main opposition.  
  Philippines Local Government Code: The code mandates participation by the non-
governmental organization (NGOs) in local decision making. It is not clear that this would 
be desirable if NGOs simply represent  special interest groups. 
  Croatia Budget Transparency: An independent think tank, The Institute of Public Finance, 
publishes independent analysis of government budget which receives media attention. 
This is to be commended but impact may be small as governments typically are artful in 
dealing with such exposure. 
  Brazil Participatory Budgeting:  Porto Alegre’s experience is well documented as a 
successful experience but awaits critical evaluation in terms of satisfaction of the median 
voter with the process and also its broader applicability. 
  Niger Participatory M&E System: Donor supported monitoring and evaluation of 
community projects is reported to be working well. Is it sustainable? Will it work without 
donor assistance? These questions remain to be answered. 
  Marshall Island Gender Sensitive Budget: Donor supported initiative with great promise of 
success is reported to have already faltered.  
Source: Adapted from World Bank Institute (2005). 
 
  11In conclusion, while the development literature is ripe with technocratic ideas and flavor 
of the year slogans, in practice such ideas have not yielded demonstrable improvements 
in government performance anywhere. In the next section, we revisit a few ideas that 
have shown some, albeit limited, promise of success.  
4.  Approaches That Have Shown Some Promise of Success in 
Practice   
 
A number of innovations in government during the last two decades have demonstrated 
some potential for success.  These are briefly highlighted in the following paragraphs: 
 
Letting the Sun Shine in on Government Operations 
 
Enlarging the sphere of information on government operations available to citizens at 
large creates an enabling environment for government accountability. Two important 
examples are Citizens’ Report Card in Banglore, India where an independent citizens’ 
right to information advocacy group publicizes the service delivery performance of state 
and local governments and demands action to overcome bottlenecks (see Paul 2002). 
Another approach practiced in Uganda with some success was the expenditure tracking 




The subsidiarity principle argues for assignment of responsibility to the lowest order of 
government unless a convincing case can be made for higher order assignment (Shah 
2007). The European Union adopted this principle as a framework for jurisdictional 
design. Conceptually, this principle strengthens bottom-up accountability by moving 
public decision making closer to people. In practice some form of democratic governance 
is required for such accountability to work. Therefore success of such a principle requires 
comprehensive political, administrative and fiscal decentralization. Most developing 
  12countries are prepared to implement political decentralization but show reluctance in 
shifting fiscal and administrative powers to local governments (Shah, 2002).  
 
Results Based Accountability 
 
Results based accountability requires a framework to hold government to account for 
service delivery performance.   Such approaches are characterized as new public 
management and have the following common elements: 
 
•  Contracts or work program agreements based on prespecified outputs, performance 
targets, and budgetary allocations 
•  Managerial flexibility, coupled with accountability for results 
•  Use of subsidiarity principle in assigning responsibility to various orders of 
government 
•  Competitive public service provision.  
 
There are two alternate approaches to results based accountability that have been 
implemented by a selected group of countries, one relying on market-like arrangements 
and the other relying on managerial norms and competence (Table 2). The former 
strategy, “making managers manage,” used by New Zealand, specifies contracts with 
budgetary allocations and competitive pressures.  The latter approach “letting managers 
manage,” is practiced in Australia and Sweden. Both strategies provide the flexibility 
public managers need to improve performance. The critical differences between them are 
the reliance on incentives and competitive spirit in the first and good will and trust in the 
latter. The two approaches take different perspectives on how to reward public servants. 
The performance-based contracts reward the chief executive financially if the 
organization achieves its performance targets. The empowerment approach holds that 
public servants are more motivated by the intrinsic rewards of public service than 
material benefits. The contract-based approach relies on incentives and competitive 
market mechanisms to enforce accountability of public managers. The empowerment 
  13approach simply hopes that managers will be ethically and professionally motivated for 





Table 2 Comparison of Two Alternate Results Based Accountability Approaches 
 
Theoretical Models  Make the Managers Manage  Let the Managers Manage 
Strategies  Market-like arrangements  Managerial norms and competence 
Mechanism  Contracts Empowerment 
Commonality  Give public managers the flexibility they need to improve performance 
Differences  -- Using specific, tightly written 
performance contracts that leave little 
room for trust  
-- motivate improvements with extrinsic 
rewards 
-- Implicitly trusting public managers to 
exercise their judgment intelligently 
-- motivate primarily by the intrinsic 
rewards of public service. 
Examples  New Zealand  Australia, Sweden, USA 
Source: Shah and Shen, 2007  
 
It is important to stress that managerial accountability must be based on outputs rather 
than outcomes as the latter are beyond mangers’ direct control, difficult to define and 
quantify, and impossible to use as a costing basis. Major justifications for including output 
based accountability are:  (1) It is difficult or implausible to link outcomes directly with 
managerial actions and decisions as outcomes are remote in time and space from what the 
program does and how it interacts with other factors. The extent of a manager’s direct 
control over outputs is usually much more substantial than outcomes; (2) Outcomes are 
immensely difficult to identify, and certainly difficult to quantify. The timescale for 
measuring outcomes normally spans some time after the program intervention, and is 
generally not in sync with the same budgeting cycle;  and (3) Calculating the cost of the 
effort to achieve outcomes can be more difficult than costing outputs (Kristensen, et al. 
2002, 16). Outcomes are typically achieved not just as the result of a single intervention 
by one program in isolation, but by the interaction of a number of different 
  14planned/unplanned factors and interventions. Hence, it is inappropriate and unrealistic to 
hold public managers accountable for outcomes. The focus on outputs as practiced in 
New Zealand and Malaysia offers greater potential for accountability for results. 
Outcomes however should be monitored and could be the basis for cabinet accountability; 
an exclusive emphasis on quantitative output measures without a focus on at least some 
form on outcomes can distort attention in delivery agencies and run the risk of losing 
sight of the bigger picture with regard to the impact of their programs on citizens and 
society.  
 
On the way to fostering outputs-based accountability, it is essential to provide more 
managerial flexibility through relaxing central input controls. Relaxing central input 
controls operates at two levels: first, the consolidation of various budget lines into a 
single appropriation for all operating costs (salaries, travel, supplies, etc.); second, the 
relaxation of a variety of central management rules that inhibit managerial flexibility, 
particularly the personnel management function where most central rules exist. The 
personnel cost is generally the largest component of operating expenditures, and it makes 
little difference to consolidate budget lines if central rules in this area prevent any 
flexibility. Sweden’s experience in dismantling central control over human resource 
management offers some interesting insights (Blöndal, 2003). 
 
Alternate Service Delivery Framework 
 
The alternative service delivery framework represents a dynamic consultative and 
participatory process of public sector restructuring that improves the delivery of services 
to clients by sharing governance functions with individuals, community groups, the 
private sector and other government entities, introducing competitive pressures to public 
service provision. The implementation of this approach requires subjecting government 
operations to the following seven sequential tests: 
 
1.  Public Interest Test: Does the program area or activity continue to serve a public 
interest? 
  152.  Role of Government Test: Is there a legitimate and necessary role for the 
government in this program area or activity? 
3.  Jurisdictional Design Test: By applying subsidiarity principle, what would be the 
appropriate roles of various orders of government? 
4.  Partnership Test: What activities or programs should or could be transferred in 
whole or in part to the private or voluntary sector? 
5.  Competition Test: Are public providers subject to competitive pressures from non-
government providers? How should financing be structured to foster competition 
in provision of public services?  
6.  Efficiency Test: If the program or activity continues, how could its efficiency be 
improved? 
7.  Affordability Test: Is the resultant package of programs and activities affordable 
within the fiscal constraints? If not, what programs or activities should be 
abandoned? 
The ASD framework described above can help rationalize government operations and 
subject government provision to competitive pressures from non-government providers. 
Since the 1990s, federal and provincial governments in Canada have had significant 
success in improving service delivery performance through the use of this framework 




Benchmarking represents comparing one’s performance against its own comparators. 
With enhanced focus on government accountability especially at the local level, local 
governments in North America use neighboring jurisdictions to get a handle on their 
relative efficiency and performance. This introduces a sense of competition to deliver 
services more cost effectively. Benchmarking is also used to compare one jurisdiction’s 
performance against its own performance historically. Such a comparison can reveal 
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in important public decisions that may have important bearing on their quality of life. 
Switzerland requires public referenda for all major projects and policy changes and in 
Canada, questions of national importance have also been decided in this way (Bauch 




A citizens’ charter is defined as a constitutional and/or legal enactment by which the 
government binds itself to delivering specified standards and quality of public services, 
while being held accountable for non-delivery.  Malaysia followed this approach to 
improving quality and access of its public services. A “clients’ charter” was established 
in 1993 which required specification of standards of services to form the basis of public 
accountability of government agencies and departments. This charter requires all 
agencies/departments to identify their customers and establish their needs. Agencies are 
further required to notify clients about the standards of services available. Public agencies 
are required to report and publish (in print and on the web) annually on both service 
improvements and compliance failures. Corrective action is required to deal with 
compliance failures. Clients also have a right to redress through the Public Complaints 
Bureau (see Chiu, 1997, OECD, 1998, Siddiquee, 2006a,b, 2005) .  
 
A similar approach has been carried out by the local government in Naga City, 
Philippines. For all local public services delivered by the city, citizens are advised on the 
service standards and how they could obtain access to such services (see City 
Government of Naga, 2003). 
     
5.  Why Access Remains A Nagging Problem:  Conceptual 
Perspectives 
 
  17Two recent important conceptual perspectives explain why access to basic services by the 
poor remains a field of dreams. The first perspective is a reinterpretation of the new 
public management literature (NPM) as elaborated by Mark Moore and others (see 
Moore, 1996, Shah, 2005) and the second attempts to address the same problem by using 
newer ideas from the Neo-institutional economics literature (NIE).  We discuss these 
perspectives in turn in the following paragraphs.   
 
Discordance among Mission, Authorizing Environment and Operational Capacity and 
Bureaucratic Culture: New Public Management Perspectives (NPM) 
 
A simple way to see why the public sector is dysfunctional, does not deliver much in 
developing countries, and yet is difficult to reform, is to have a closer look at public 
sector mission and values, its authorizing environment, and its operational capacity. 
a)  Public sector mission and values.  Societal values and norms, e.g., as embodied in 
the constitution or in annual budget policy statements, may be useful points of 
reference for public sector mandates and the values inherent in these mandates.  
Unwritten societal norms that are widely shared or acknowledged should also be 
taken into consideration.  In industrialized countries, the mission and values of the 
public sector are spelled out in terms of a medium term policy framework.  For 
example, there is a formal requirement in Canada and New Zealand that a policy 
statement of this type be tabled in the parliament by March 31 (about 2-3 months in 
advance of the budget statement).  Public sector values in developing countries are 
rarely addressed.  This is because the orientation of the public sector remains 
towards “command and control” rather than to serve the citizenry.  For an official 
trained in ‘command and control’, the need to develop a code of conduct with a 
client orientation, may appear frivolous. 
b)  Authorizing environment.  This includes formal (budgetary processes and 
institutions) and informal institutions of participation and accountability.  Do 
these institutions and processes work as intended in providing an enabling 
environment for the public sector to meet its goals? Do various levels of 
government act in the spirit of the constitution in exercising their responsibilities? 
  18What are the checks and balances against deviant behavior? In industrialized 
countries, institutional norms are strictly adhered to and there are severe moral, 
legal, voter and market sanctions against non-compliance.  In a developing 
country environment, non-compliance is often neither monitored nor subject to 
any sanctions. 
c)  Operational capacity and constraints.  What is authorized is not necessarily what 
will get done as the available operational capacity may not be consistent with the 
task at hand.  Further, even the operational capacity that is available may be 
circumvented by the bureaucratic culture or incentives that reward rent seeking, 
command and control, corruption, and patronage, all with little concern for 
responsiveness to citizen preferences in service delivery and almost a total lack of 
accountability to citizen-voters.  
 
     Figure 1: Public Sector Institutional Environment 











Figure 1 shows that discordance among mission, authorizing environment and 
operational capacity contributes to a dismal public sector performance in the delivery of 
public services. Furthermore what is delivered in terms of outputs and outcomes are 
typically inconsistent with citizens’ preferences.   The challenge of public sector reform, 
therefore, in any developing country is to harmonize the public sector’s mission and 
values, its authorizing environment and its operational capacity so that there is a close, if 
not perfect, correspondence among these three aspects of governance. Such a task is 
  19daunting for many developing countries since they often have lofty goals, yet lack an 
authorizing environment that is capable of translating these goals into a policy 
framework.  This problem is often compounded further by bureaucratic incentives that 
make any available operational capacity to implement such a framework rather 
dysfunctional. 
 
Table 3 presents a stylized comparison of the institutional environment in a primitive 
society, a developing country and an industrialized country. It is interesting to note that 
while technical capacity in the modern sense was non-existent in a traditional society, due 
to harmonization of its goals, its authorizing environment and its operational capacity, 
public sector outcomes were consistent with member preferences. The cultures of such 
societies more often than not focused on accountability for results.  The system of 
rewards and punishment was credible and swift and much of the business relations were 
based on informality and trust.  Thus, while per capita GDP in such societies was quite 
low, member satisfaction with collective action was observed to be high and quite 
possibly not too far behind the degree of satisfaction with public sector experience in 
today’s industrial societies. 
 
Table 3: Public Sector Institutional Environment—Stylized Facts 
  Traditional  society  Developing country Industrial country 
Goals  Clear and realistic  Vague and 
grandiose 
Clear and realistic 
Authorizing 












Dysfunctional Consistent  and 
functional 
Evaluation capacity  Strong  Weak   Strong 
Public sector 
  orientation 
Ouput Input  controls, 
command and 
control 




  making  
Decentralized Centralized Decentralized 
Private sector 
  environment 
Informality and trust  Semi-formality but 
lack of trust and 
Formal and legal 




Snakes and ladders  “Gotcha”  Learning and 
improving 
Source : Shah (2005) 
This contrasts with the picture that can be portrayed for a typical developing country. In 
such a country, there is discordance in the society’s goals, authorizing environment and 
operational capacity. As a consequence of this disharmony, not much gets accomplished 
and citizens’ expectations are belied. Lack of accountability and focus of the evaluation 
culture leads to a systemic malaise, blunting any self-correcting mechanisms which may 
exist. Semi-formality imposes additional costs on doing business and does not lead to any 
benefits in business relations due to a lack of respect for the law. Contracts may not be 
honored and therefore carry little value. In view of the dysfunctional nature of the public 
sector in many developing countries, it is important for these to leapfrog forward (or even 
backwards) to a public sector culture that puts a premium on client orientation and 
accountability for results.  
 
Commitment Problem in the Public Sector:  Perspectives of the New Institutional 
Economics (NIE) 
 
Finally, neo-institutional economics (NIE) presents a refreshing perspective on the lack 
of access to public services in developing countries. The NIE treats citizens as principals 
and public officials as agents. The principals (citizens) have bounded rationality – they 
act rationally based upon the incomplete information they have. In order to have a more 
informed perspective on public sector operations, they face high transaction costs in 
acquiring and processing the information. On the other hand, agents (public officials) are 
better informed. This asymmetry of information allows agents to indulge in opportunistic 
behavior which goes unchecked due to high transaction costs faced by the principals and 
lack or inadequacy of countervailing institutions to enforce accountable governance
2. 
                                                 
2 Following this line of thought, Lambsdorff et al. note that in fighting corruption from a NIE perspective policy 
makers should aim to “encourage betrayal among corrupt parties, to destabilize corrupt agreements, to disallow corrupt 
contracts to be legally enforced, to hinder the operation of corrupt middlemen and to find clearer ways of regulating 
conflicts of interest.” 
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mechanisms for contract enforcement, weak judicial systems and inadequate provisions 
for public safety. This raises the transaction costs in the economy, further raising the cost 
of private capital as well as the cost of public service provision. The problem is further 
compounded by path dependency (i.e. a major break with the past is difficult to achieve 
as any major reforms are likely to be blocked by influential interest groups), cultural and 
historical factors and mental models where those who are victimized by corruption feel 
that attempts to deal with corruption will lead to further victimization, with little hope of 
corrupt actors being brought to justice. These considerations lead principals to the 
conclusion that any attempt on their part to constrain corrupt behaviors will invite strong 
retaliation from powerful interests. Therefore, citizen empowerment (e.g. through 
devolution, fiscal transparency, citizens’ charter, bill of rights, elections and other forms 
of civic engagement) assumes critical importance in combating corruption because it may 
have a significant impact on the incentives faced by public officials to be responsive to 
public interest (see Shah, 2007).    
6.   A Synthesis: Citizen-Centric Governance as an Approach to 
Dealing with Access 
We have reviewed ideas emerging from the literature on political science, economics, 
public administration, law, federalism, and the NIE with a view to developing an 
integrated analytical framework to improve access to public services. The dominant 
concern in this literature is that the incentives and accountability framework faced by 
various orders of government are not conducive to service delivery being consistent with 
citizens’ preferences. As a result, corruption, waste, and inefficiencies permeate public 
governance. Top-down hierarchical controls are ineffective; there is little accountability 
because citizens are not empowered to hold governments accountable (Shah, 2005, 
Andrews and Shah, 2005, Huther, Roberts and Shah, 1997).  
 
Fiscal federalism practices around the world are focused on structures and processes, 
with little regard for outputs and outcomes. These practices support top-down structures 
with preeminent federal legislation (that is, federal legislation overrides any subnational 
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micromanaging the system. Hierarchical controls exercised by various layers of 
government have an internal rule-based focus with little concern for their mandates. 
Government competencies are determined on the basis of technical and administrative 
capacity, with almost no regard for client orientation, bottom-up accountability, and 
lowering of transaction costs for citizens. Various orders of government indulge in 
uncooperative zero-sum games for control.  
 
This tug of war leads to large swings in the balance of power. Shared rule is a source of 
much confusion and conflict, especially in federal systems. Local governments are 
typically the handmaidens of states and are given straitjacket mandates and limited home 
rule in their competencies. As well, citizens are only able to exercise limited voice and 
exit options.  In short, local governments in this system of “federalism for the 
governments, by the governments, and of the governments” get crushed under a regime 
of intrusive controls by higher levels of governments.  
 
The governance implications of such a system are quite obvious. Various orders of 
government suffer from agency problems associated with incomplete contracts and 
undefined property rights, as the assignment of taxing, spending, and regulatory powers 
remains to be clarified—especially in areas of shared rule. Intergovernmental bargaining 
leads to high transaction costs for citizens. Universalism and pork-barrel politics result in 
a tragedy of commons, as various orders of government compete to claim a higher share 
of common pool resources. Under this system of governance, citizens are treated as 
agents rather than as principals (see Shah and S. Shah, 2006, and Shah and F. Shah, 
2007).  
 
On how to reverse this trend and make governments responsive and accountable to 
citizens, the dominant themes emphasized in the literature are the subsidiarity principle, 
the principle of fiscal equivalency, the creation of public value, results-based 
accountability, and the minimization of transaction costs for citizens, as discussed earlier. 
These themes are useful but should be integrated into a broader framework of citizen-
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compatible with a public sector focus on service delivery and bottom-up accountability. 
Such integration is expected to deal with the commitment problem in various levels of 
government by empowering citizens and by limiting their agents’ ability to indulge in 
opportunistic behavior.  
 
Such integration takes as the starting point, the neo-institutional perspective that various 
orders of government (agents) are created to serve, preserve, protect and promote public 
interest based upon the values and expectations of the citizens of a state (principals). The 
underlying assumption is that there is a widely shared notion of the public interest. In 
return, governments are given coercive powers to carry out their mandates. A stylized 
view of this public interest can be characterized by four dimensions of governance 
outcomes that embody the spirit and substance of citizen-centric governance. 
 
Responsive Governance.  The fundamental task of governing is to promote and pursue 
collective interest while respecting formal (rule of law) and informal norms. This is done 
by government creating an enabling environment to do the right things – that is it 
promotes and delivers services consistent with citizen preferences.  Further, the 
government carries out only the tasks that it is authorized to do, that is, it follows the 
compact authorized by citizens at large 
 
Fair (equitable) Governance.  For peace, order and good government, the government 
ensures protection of the poor, minorities and disadvantaged members of the society. 
  
Responsible Governance.  The government does it right i.e. governmental authority is 
carried out following due process with integrity (absence of corruption), with fiscal 
prudence, with concern for providing the best value for money and with a view to earning 
the trust of the people. 
 
Accountable Governance.  Citizens can hold the government to account for all its actions. 
This requires that the government lets the sun shine in on its operations and works to 
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respects the role of countervailing formal and informal institutions of accountability in 
governance.  
 
Given the focus on governance outcomes, Table 4 presents some preliminary ideas for 
discussion on how to operationalize these concepts in reforming public governance in 




Table 4: Criteria for Citizen –Centric Governance 
Governance outcome  Relevant considerations  
Responsive 
governance 
-  Public services consistent with citizen preferences 
-  Direct, possibly interactive, democracy 
-  Safety of life, liberty and property 
-  Peace, order, rule of law 
-  Freedom of choice and expression 
-  Improvements in economic and social outcomes 
-  Improvements in quantity, quality and access of public 
services 
-  Improvements in quality of life 
Fair governance  -  Fulfillment of citizens’ values and expectations in 
relation to social justice, and due process  
-  access of the poor, minorities and disadvantaged  groups 
to basic public services 
-  non-discriminatory laws and enforcement 
-  egalitarian income distribution 
-  equal opportunity for all 
Responsible 
governance 
   -      open, transparent and prudent economic, fiscal and          
financial management  
        -     working better and costing less 
       -     ensuring integrity of its operations 
       -     earning trust 
       -     managing risks. 
       -     competitive service delivery 
       -      focus on results  
Accountable 
governance 
-  justice-able rights and due process 
-  access to justice,  information  
-  judicial integrity and independence 
-  effective legislature and civil society oversight 
  25-  recall of officials and rollbacks of program possible 
-  effective limits to government intervention 
-  effective restraints to special interest capture 




The distinguishing features of citizen-centered governance are: 
 
•  Citizen empowerment through a rights-based approach (direct democracy provisions, 
citizens’ charter)  
•  Bottom-up accountability for results 
•  Subsidiarity principle and home rule  
•  Evaluation of government performance as the facilitator of a network of providers by 
citizens as governors, taxpayers, and consumers of public services  
 
The framework emphasizes reforms that strengthen the role of citizens as the principals 
and create incentives for government agents to comply with their mandates.  The 
commitment problem may be mitigated by creating citizen-centered local governance—
by having direct democracy provisions, introducing governing for results in government 
operations, and reforming the structure of governance, thus shifting decision making 
closer to the people. Direct democracy provisions require referenda on major issues and 
large projects and require that citizens have the right to veto any legislation or 
government program. A “governing for results” framework requires government 
accountability to citizens for service delivery performance. Hence, citizens have a charter 
defining their basic rights as well as their rights of access to specific standards of public 
services. Output-based intergovernmental transfers strengthen compliance with such 
standards and strengthen accountability and citizen empowerment (Shah 2006) 
7.  Implementing the Framework: Potentials and Pitfalls 
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the past were doomed as they failed to empower people to demand access to basic 
services from their governments. To overcome this, the paper has presented a 
framework for citizen empowerment that if implemented could serve to create a 
responsive, responsible, fair and accountable governance in developing countries. But 
who will and how to bell this cat? The paper has also provided a few simple principles 
and practical ideas to overcome formidable obstacles to such fundamental reform.   
 
The paper nevertheless recognizes that implementing the above framework is the 
fundamental challenge of development. Technically such a framework is easy to 
implement. The practice is another matter. Under current circumstances, it would be 
nearly impossible to implement such a framework in developing countries due to the 
confluence of opposing factors. Potential stakeholders blocking such reforms would 
include some powerful political and bureaucratic elites in developing countries and 
some development consultants.  While opposition by the former is obvious and explicit, 
opposition by the latter is latent and implicit, arising mainly from consultants and 
technocrats whose very existence depends upon ad infinitum reinvention of 
technocratic wheels to stay in business.    
 
Not everything is lost though. Globalization and the information revolution are bringing 
about citizen empowerment by allowing the sun to shine in on government operations, 
empowering citizens to hold government to account through the instantaneous 
expansion of their knowledge and information base. These are powerful influences in 
moving governments to accept rights based accountability, albeit reluctantly.  This 
gives a flickering hope for moving this fundamental reform agenda forward. The ideas 
suggested in this paper could provide the motivation for reformers within and beyond 
government to turn this flicker of hope into flames of reform that engulf all those 
powerful interests standing in the way of necessary transformation.  This is because the 
paper provides pathways to reforming the corrupt and incompetent regimes by 
empowering the disempowered citizens who, have the audacity to make real the hope 
for better governments and fulfilled demands. The conceptual and pragmatic 
  27perspective presented here could possibly assist citizens that would like to see their 
governments reformed and also government leaders seeking to serve their people better 
and earning their trust.    
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